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Abstract
Resources are often allocated in groups through decentralized nonmarket
mechanisms. We experimentally investigate groups where a rich representative
allocates resources among poorer members, who can announce disapproval
by voting for a measure hurting the representative. We examine the effect of
inequality aversion by keeping information on the allocation private in one and
commonly known in another condition. Further, we investigate whether casting
votes publicly or secretly influences allocation and voting behavior. We find that
disapproval rates are highest with secret voting or a commonly known resource
allocation. Disapproval voting fails to stimulate representatives to appear more
prosocial, but rather induces them to keep everything. Private information on the
allocation and public voting leads to least disapproval and exclusion of the poorest
group members from the resources. The analysis shows that inequality aversion of
poorer group members crucially interacts with the investigated institutional and
informational details of the resource allocation situation.
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Markets and government transfers are undoubtedly important allocation mechan-
isms of scarce resources. However, in many instances, these mechanisms are not
available or suitable and money, goods, or services are allocated in other, decentra-
lized ways. The allocation of budgets between departments at universities, firms, or
governmental bodies and the allocation of resources in organizations and alliances
like the United Nations and the European Union are macro examples at hand.
At a more micro scale, people all over the world participate in clubs, voluntary
groups, and other organizations where resources are allocated in a decentralized
nonmarket fashion (Knack and Keefer 1997). In addition, for many African coun-
tries that are constrained by both weak governance structures and underdeveloped
markets, the allocation of resources through decentralized nonmarket channels has
a promising potential to find a way out of poverty and stimulate economic growth
(Hayami and Godo 2005). In fact, development aid is increasingly distributed
through representatives of local groups and communities. According to conservative
calculations, the World Bank’s portfolio allocated in this way has increased from
$325 million in 1996 to $2 billion in 2003 (Mansuri and Rao 2004). Yet, several
studies point out that a main difficulty of such community-driven development lies
in the vulnerability to capture by local elites (Alderman 2001; Conning and Kevane
2002; Platteau and Gaspart 2003; Ravallion 2003; D’Exelle 2009).
In this article, we experimentally study if and how the decentralized allocation of
resources in unequal groups is affected by the interaction of inequality aversion and
different information conditions regarding the allocation of resources and disap-
proval voting. Although our setup reflects the basic features of many of the decen-
tralized resource allocation situations mentioned above, for concreteness, in the
following we frame it as an extended version of the so-called leader-disciplining
mechanism (LDM). This mechanism was first introduced by Platteau and Gaspart
(2003) as a theoretically effective means to deter elite capture in community-
driven development. The LDM describes a strategic situation between an aid donor
and a local relatively rich leader representing a village who allocates resources pro-
vided by the aid donor among himself and the poorer villagers. The main feature of
the LDM is that the aid donor does not provide resources at once but in two tranches,
where the second tranche is paid out to the representative only after the villagers
approved the representatives division of resources and, hence, is thought to serve
as a disciplining device for the representative.
In our version of the LDM, the disciplining device is the strongest, hence, most
effective, possible as it is factually equivalent to asking the representative to allocate
the promised resources out of his own pocket first, with the guarantee of full reim-
bursement in case the villagers approve the allocation, but no reimbursement in case
the villagers disapprove it. Specifically, in our experiment, we investigate resource
allocations in groups consisting of a permanent representative and three other group
members (villagers) who differ in their initial wealth. The rich representative
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repeatedly allocates resources among the poorer villagers, who have (also repeatedly)
the possibility to announce their approval or disapproval of the resource allocation by
voting for or against it.
Besides the allocation behavior of representatives and voting behavior of villag-
ers in general, we are also interested in how these behaviors are affected by impor-
tant institutional and informational details of the resource allocation situation.
Furthermore, since by now there is ample evidence that people care not only about
their own material well-being but are averse toward inequality (for surveys see, e.g.,
Camerer 2003; Cooper and Kagel 2010), we also investigate if and how these details
interact with inequality aversion.
First, to gain insights into the interaction between inequality aversion in unequal
groups and disapproval voting, we vary the information on the allocation decision
of the rich representative by keeping it private in one condition but making it common
information in another condition. If inequality aversion is a relevant behavioral
motive, it should manifest itself in differences in voting behavior across information
conditions, which in turn may differentially affect the representative’s distribution
decisions. Importantly, at the outset, it is unclear whether inequality aversion works
in favor or against enhancing efficiency and equality (see, e.g., the stream of experi-
mental studies on trust and gift-exchange games starting with Berg, Dickhaut, and
McCabe [1995] and Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl [1993] that show that inequality
aversion can have a positive effect, and, e.g., van Damme and Güth [1998] and Okada
and Riedl [2005] who find that it can be detrimental). Therefore, from an organiza-
tional and policy design perspective, it is interesting and important to gain better
knowledge of the interaction between inequality aversion and institutional details.
Second, we examine whether and how casting votes publicly or secretly influ-
ences allocation decisions and voting behavior. Although secret voting is surely a
widely used way of casting votes, casual evidence suggests that public voting is pop-
ular, too; especially in smaller groups that interact repeatedly. It strikes us to be of
importance for policy design to investigate how these different modes of balloting
affect the allocation of resources and disapproval voting, especially in repeated
interactions and with actors of unequal wealth. In our experiment, we impose secret
voting in one condition and public voting in another. Importantly, in a repeated inter-
action setting as the one we investigate, a representative may benefit from public
voting in that she or he can identify those who approved and those who disapproved
the resource allocation. The representative may use this information and in response
reallocate resources in the future accordingly. The anticipation and experience of
such strategically guided resource allocations may in turn induce different voting
behaviors in secret and public voting.
We use a laboratory experiment to analyze the effects of information on alloca-
tion and voting behavior because it allows us to fully control the variables of interest.
In the field, it is impossible to observe behavior when voting is secret and when it is
public, in otherwise identical situations. The same holds true for the variation of
information regarding the actually allocated resources. Field empirical data usually
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allow observing behavior either when allocations are publicly known or when they
are private knowledge. To causally investigate the effect of information disclosure,
the controlled environment of the laboratory is very helpful.
In our analysis, we specifically focus on the following issues: (1) the determinants
of disapproval voting behavior of villagers, (2) the allocation decision strategies of
representatives, and (3) the response of representatives to disapproval of an alloca-
tion. For all three issues, we examine in detail how the observed behaviors interact
with information on resource allocation and the two voting procedures.
Our main results are briefly summarized here. First, observed behavior contra-
dicts predictions based on the standard assumption of common knowledge of ration-
ality and narrow selfishness but is consistent with the assumption that (at least some)
of the participants are inequality averse. Second, villagers are more likely to disap-
prove when voting is secret or information on the allocation is common, which leads
to higher disapproval rates in these conditions. Third, villagers’ voting behavior is
strongly influenced by the share they receive and the poorest villager has the highest
likelihood to cast a disapproval vote. Fourth, we identify different strategies of rep-
resentatives and find that disapproval of an allocation has a detrimental effect on
representatives’ subsequent prosocial behavior. Specifically, once disapproved, rep-
resentatives switch to a strategy where they allocate nothing to the villagers and have
a strong tendency to stick to this strategy. Finally, disapproval rates vary consider-
ably across the different information conditions, which explains differences in rep-
resentatives’ strategies across treatments. In particular, representatives least often
allocate nothing to the villagers when voting is public, and completely exclude
exactly one of the villagers from the resources most often when the resource alloca-
tion is not disclosed. Moreover, it is the poorest villager who is most often excluded
by the representative. In summary, our results indicate that the behavior of villagers
is clearly driven by inequality aversion and interacts with the investigated institu-
tional designs, which in turn affects the resource allocations of representatives.
Our study is related to several streams of experimental research. The literature on
the effect of decentralized punishment in public good games and common pool set-
tings (pioneered by Fehr and Gächter [2000] and Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner
[1992], respectively) has shown that group members are ready to punish free riders
even at a cost to themselves. While related, our study differs in various aspects from
this literature. First, we do not investigate a social dilemma but a pure resource allo-
cation problem. Second, in our study ‘‘punishment’’ (i.e., disapproval) is not an indi-
vidual act but coordinated through the political instrument of voting. Third, we
analyze a situation where actors differ in their initial wealth level, which is not the
case in most of the social dilemma with punishment studies (for recent exceptions,
see Reuben and Riedl 2009, 2011). Studies extending the ultimatum game to multi-
ple responders (Knez and Camerer 1995; Güth, Schmidt, and Sutter 2004; Riedl and
Vyrastekova 2004) are also related. The main difference with these studies is that in
our experiment the rejection of an unfair resource allocation cannot be imposed uni-
laterally but is organized via majority voting. In addition, as in the social dilemma
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experiments, in these multiple responder ultimatum game experiments responders
do not differ in their initial wealth levels.
That disclosure of resource allocations may influence both proposers’
and responders’ behavior has been demonstrated for bilateral bargaining settings
(Croson 1996). However, so far the only study having looked at the importance of
information disclosure in settings with multiple responders is van Damme and Güth
(1998). Our study also adds to this literature by comparing different information
treatments regarding resource allocation and voting. Finally, our study is related
to the experimental political science literature on committee decision making that
emerged mainly in the 70s and 80s of the last century (for a survey, see McKelvey
and Ordeshook 1990) and the more recent investigations into legislative bargaining
(see, e.g., Fréchette, Kagel, and Lehrer 2003; Kagel, Sung, and Winter 2010). Our
research differs from that literature, as these studies are interested in coalitional bar-
gaining outcomes and the behavior of committees and legislative bodies, while we
investigate a bargaining mechanism with one representative and add sanctioning via
the political instrument of voting.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: the next section presents the experi-
mental design and procedures, followed by theoretical considerations and the pre-
sentation of research hypotheses. Thereafter, we present the empirical results. In
the last section, we summarize the experiment and present some conclusions.
Experimental Design and Procedures
The experiment groups consisting of one ‘‘representative’’ and three ‘‘villagers’’ are
engaged in a repeated game, where the representative allocates resources among the
group members, after which the villagers can vote for approval or disapproval of the
allocation.1 At the beginning of a round, group members receive an initial endow-
ment that can be thought of as their initial wealth. Since we are interested in alloca-
tion behavior in unequal groups, these endowments differ across group members,
inducing initial wealth inequality. It is reasonable to assume that the representative
is the richest person (see Platteau and Gaspart 2003; Mansuri and Rao 2004, among
others), an assumption also often made in more general political economy models
(see, e.g., Besley and Coate 1997). Therefore, in the experiment, the representative,
R, receives the largest endowment ER ¼ 200 francs. The poorer villagers also differ
in their initial wealth. There are two ‘‘middle-endowment villagers,’’ M1 and M2,
each receiving an endowment EM1 ¼ EM2 ¼ 150 francs, and one ‘‘low-endowment’’
villager L, the poorest group member, who receives EL¼ 100 francs.2 The allocation
game is played for ten consecutive rounds in the same group. Each round consists of
the following two stages:
Stage 1: At the beginning of the stage, the representative R allocates an additional
amount of resources I ¼ 200 francs, which can be thought of as the resources
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potentially provided by an aid donor, among all group members. Importantly,
the leader-disciplining mechanism (LDM) of the aid donor stipulates that the
allocation has to be paid out of the pocket of the representative first and is reim-
bursed by the aid donor only in case the villagers approve the allocation. At the
end of the stage, villagers are informed about their shares.
Stage 2: Villagers M1, M2, and L simultaneously and independently vote in favor
or against approval of the allocation. Thereafter, all members are informed
whether the proposed allocation is approved or not and, hence, whether the rep-
resentative is reimbursed or not, and individual earnings are calculated.
In stage 2, an allocation is disapproved by simple majority voting. The monetary
payoffs of the group members are determined in the following way. In principle, the
income of each member increases according to the representative’s allocation of 200
francs. However, if two or three villagers vote in favor of disapproval, the represen-
tative’s payoff is in fact reduced by an amount K ¼ 200 francs, because in that case
he is not reimbursed by the aid donor. In addition, each villager’s earnings are
reduced by an amount k ¼ 20 francs, which may be interpreted as transaction costs
of disapproval voting.3 If less than two villagers vote in favor of disapproval, no
costs are inflicted on any of the members.
We have chosen the amount of resources potentially provided by the aid donor
such that the representative can in principle equalize earnings for all members.
Furthermore, compared to experiments that allow for costly punishment, in our case
disapproval has a high impact to cost ratio and hits the representative in absolute
terms relatively severely. We have deliberately chosen these parameter values
because disapproval voting needs coordination among villagers, which may make
this mechanism behaviorally less effective than individual punishment as implemen-
ted in public goods games (see, e.g., Fehr and Gächter 2000; Egas and Riedl 2008).
Next to the general allocation behavior of the representative and the voting beha-
vior of the villagers, we are interested in how these behaviors interact with important
informational and institutional details. One such detail is the information villagers
have regarding the representative’s allocation. This is particularly interesting
because experimental evidence shows that people do care about earnings inequal-
ities (see, e.g., Camerer 2003; Cooper and Kagel 2010). In consequence, in our
setup, differences in information on the representative’s allocation may influence
villagers’ voting decisions, as different information conditions allow for different
social comparison processes. In turn, if the representative is anticipating such behav-
ioral effects, actual allocation decisions may also depend on the available informa-
tion regarding the allocation. To investigate this, we implement two conditions that
differ in the information villagers have on the representative’s allocation. Specifi-
cally, we compare a situation with Common Information on the allocation of the
resources (CI, for short) with a situation where each villager has only Private Infor-
mation on her individual absolute share (PI). In our example of a representative allo-
cating aid resources among villagers, information on the allocation is likely to be
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relevant. It is easily conceivable that potential protest against unequal aid distributions
(including ‘‘elite capture’’) can be more easily avoided when the representative man-
ages to keep private how the total amount of aid resources is distributed.
In addition, we are interested whether and, if yes, how two prominent ways of
casting votes affect allocation and voting behavior. First, secret voting, which is the
general principle in most democratic general elections, and, second, public voting
that is often implemented in decision making in smaller groups, such as committees
and other important decision bodies (e.g., the grand jury). Together with the infor-
mation conditions regarding the representative’s allocation this leads to the 2  2
factorial design depicted in Table 1. The table also shows the number of groups
in each treatment, which are our independent units of observation.
The experiment was completely computerized using the Z-tree software (Fischba-
cher 2007) and conducted in the computer lab of Maastricht University. In total, 124
students participated in thirty-one groups; 52.4 percent of the participants were male
and the average age was 21.8 with a minimum of 18 and a maximum of 31. Each sub-
ject participated in exactly one treatment and none had participated in a similar experi-
ment before. Each session lasted between 90 and 120 minutes and average earnings
were 22.20 euros, which varied between 10.70 euros and 31.70 euros. Detailed experi-
mental procedures and the instructions can be found in the Supplementary Material
(SM, Resource Allocations and Disapproval Voting in Unequal Groups).
Theoretical Considerations and Hypotheses
In this section, we develop our main behavioral hypotheses. We start with a discus-
sion of probable strategies of villagers in the voting subgame, and how these could be
influenced by inequality aversion and the implemented information conditions. There-
after, we look at the strategy choices of the representative. Our hypotheses are partly
based on theoretical considerations and partly derived from behavioral regularities
observed in other experiments. For convenience, we present the theoretical arguments
informally and delegate their formal description and derivations to the SM.
As any decision situation involving a majority voting rule, our game is plagued
with the existence of a plethora of Nash (1950) equilibria (see, e.g., the theoretical
and experimental literature on legislative bargaining; Baron and Ferejohn 1989;
Fréchette et al. 2003). In fact, it can be shown (Proposition 1 in the SM) that any
allocation decision by the representative can be supported as a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium (SPNE; Selten 1965). However, most of these equilibria have the
Table 1. Treatments and Number of Groups.
Secret voting Public voting
Private information on the allocation (PI) 8 8
Common information on the allocation (CI) 7 8
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unappealing feature that they involve the use of weakly dominated strategies.
Therefore, we focus on SPNE that only involve undominated strategies (uSPNE
for short). In our game, such equilibria are characterized by the attractive feature
that a villager votes in favor of disapproving an allocation if and only if she
receives a higher utility in case the allocation is actually disapproved than when
it is approved. In the SM, we show that in our game such an equilibrium always
exists and is unique (Lemma 1).
Villagers’ Voting Decisions
Whether a villager votes in favor of disapproval may depend on the representative’s
allocation decision, the villager’s preferences and—because of the majority rule—
on the number of other villagers voting in favor of disapproval. With the standard
assumption of common knowledge of rationality and narrow material self-interest,
the fact that voting is costly makes all villagers prefer that the representative’s allo-
cation is not disapproved, irrespective of the actual allocation. In consequence, the
unique uSPNE predicts that we should observe representatives giving nothing (or
very little) to the villagers who will accept, because they cannot expect more in case
the allocation is disapproved (Proposition 2 in the SM).
However, there is extensive experimental evidence suggesting that this is not a
realistic outcome. For instance, in take-it-or-leave-it ultimatum games, it is regularly
observed that responders reject positive but unfair offers in favor of lower but more
equal outcomes (Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze 1982; for an overview see
Camerer 2003). To accommodate this and other behavioral regularities, models incor-
porating concerns for fairness through ‘‘inequality aversion,’’ have been developed
(Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Charness and Rabin 2002).
In our resource allocation situation, these models imply that if villagers are suffi-
ciently averse to inequality and distribution proposals are sufficiently unequal, vil-
lagers may in utility terms be better off when the representative’s proposal is
disapproved and the representative, thus, not reimbursed by the aid donor. In that
case, the overall income of the representative is reduced more than the villagers’
income, which reduces inequality between the representative and the villagers.
Specifically, we show in the SM that, if villagers are inequality averse, there are
indeed allocation decisions where villagers vote in favor of disapproval (Lemmas 2
and 3, Propositions 3 and 4 in the SM). An important insight from our theoretical
analysis is that, in order to vote for approving an allocation, the poorest villagers
need to be offered the highest shares. This implies that, for any given allocation
proposal, the likelihood that the poorest villager votes in favor of disapproval is
higher than that a middle-endowment villager will do so.4
Intuitively, the likelihood of disapproval voting depends on the representative’s
actual allocation. Indeed, for any given intensity of inequality aversion there exists
a threshold of the received share below which a villager will prefer disapproval, and
hence will vote in favor of it, while when her share is above it she will vote against
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disapproval (Lemmas 2 and 3, Propositions 3 and 4 in the SM). Consequently, we
can theoretically predict that the likelihood of voting in favor of disapproval
decreases with the share proposed to a villager. We are now ready to formulate our
first set of hypotheses regarding villagers’ behavior:
Hypothesis VIL-1: (1) Villagers’ propensity to vote in favor of disapproval
decreases with the share they are offered. (2) The poorest villagers show a higher
propensity to vote in favor of disapproval than the middle-endowment villagers.
Up to now, we have discussed that when villagers are inequality averse they may
prefer disapproval of an allocation over approving it, irrespective of whether the
whole allocation or only their own share is disclosed to them. In the following
paragraph we discuss possible effects of the investigated information conditions
on the propensity to vote in favor of disapproval. It seems intuitive that voting beha-
vior will depend on whether a villager knows the whole allocation or only her own
share. In the latter case, villagers can compare their own income only to the income
of the other three members as a whole, whereas in the former case comparisons can
be made with respect to each individual other group member. In particular, when the
whole allocation is disclosed, villagers can compare the share proposed to them with
the share the representative keeps for himself.
In the SM (Lemmas 2 and 3), we show that these differences in information dis-
closure imply different threshold levels regarding the own shares at which villagers
switch from preferring disapproval of the allocation to approval of it. Using this result,
we show that the possibility to compare one’s share directly with what the representative
keeps (as in the CI condition), instead of only with the whole group (as in the PI con-
dition), can make villagers more reluctant to accept an unfair share (Proposition 5).5
We therefore hypothesize that villagers are more willing to vote in favor of disapproval
when there is common knowledge of the distributional consequences of the representa-
tive’s allocation. Accordingly, we formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis VIL-2: Villagers are more likely to vote in favor of disapproval when
there is common information of the allocation than when they only know their
own share.
From a theoretical point of view, it is inessential whether voting is secret or public.
However, behaviorally it may make a difference especially when we take the
repeated nature of the game into account. When voting is secret individual villagers’
voting behavior is never disclosed, whereas when voting is public each villager’s
vote is known to all, including the representative. The information disclosure in the
latter case may make villagers reluctant to vote in favor of disapproval because they
may fear retaliation of the representative. In particular, given that only two villagers
need to be convinced to avoid disapproval, representatives may use information on
the voting decisions to exclude those villagers who are more difficult to satisfy. In
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turn, villagers may take this into account when deciding on which vote to cast. This
leads us to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis VIL-3: Villagers are more likely to vote in favor of disapproval of the
allocation when voting is secret than when voting is public.
The arguments leading to hypotheses VIL-2 and VIL-3 immediately imply different
expected disapproval rates, which we formulate as our next hypothesis.
Hypothesis VIL-4: Disapproval rates are higher when there is common informa-
tion on the representative’s allocation decision than when this information is
private. Disapproval is also more frequent when voting is secret than when
it is public.
Representative’s Allocation Behavior
Representatives who are strongly averse against advantageous inequality will make
proposals that equalize overall income, while representatives who are not strongly
advantageous inequality averse will behave like representatives who are pure money
maximizers.6 In the following we derive results for the latter. Recall that the LDM
inherent in our setup is thought to prevent the representative from capturing all or
most of the resources provided by the aid donor. We have seen already that under
the assumption of standard selfish preferences, the mechanism cannot prevent such
elite capture because villagers will never disapprove, irrespective of the share of
resources they are offered. Using the hypotheses on villagers’ behavior, we now dis-
cuss whether villagers’ inequality aversion will make the mechanism theoretically
more effective and how it interacts with the investigated information and voting con-
ditions. We have seen previously that with inequality averse villagers disapproval
becomes a likely outcome when allocations are sufficiently unfair. Hence, the rep-
resentative needs to consider how his allocation decision may influence the likeli-
hood of disapproval voting. For example, because disapproval is implemented by
majority voting a representative could try to build a ‘‘minimal coalition,’’ where
he satisfies only two villagers and excludes the third one by offering her nothing
(which we will call an ‘‘exclude-one’’ strategy). If successful, a representative using
such a strategy could avoid disapproval while keeping a relatively high share of the
resources. Indeed, it can be theoretically shown that if villagers are sufficiently
inequality averse such a strategy could be optimal for representatives (Propositions 3
and 4 in the SM). In principle, this holds for both the PI and the CI conditions.
Importantly, however, villagers’ inequality aversion is not known to the represen-
tative and likely varies across villagers. Therefore, if the offered shares to the villa-
gers are too low or if they are very inequality averse an ‘‘exclude-one’’ strategy
might be unsuccessful in avoiding disapproval. In that case, representatives are actu-
ally better off by choosing an ‘‘exclude-all’’ strategy where their proposal is also
likely to be disapproved but they end up with a higher overall share of the resources.
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Which of these strategies is actually preferred by a representative depends on the
likelihood of disapproval associated with each strategy. Given the hypothesized
effects of allocation disclosure and voting rules on villagers’ voting behavior
(VIL-2 and VIL-3) and, hence, the likelihood of disapproval, the frequency of the
discussed strategies will likely differ across the investigated conditions in the way
described in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis REP-1: Representatives less often use an exclude-one strategy (and
more often the exclude-all strategy) (1) when there is common information
on the allocation than when each villager only knows her own share and (2)
when voting is secret than when it is public.
In the SM, it is shown that the poorest villager needs to be offered the largest share in
order to prefer the approval outcome (Lemmas 2 and 3). Intuitively, this is the case
because she has the worst starting position and, hence, needs most compensation to
get on par with the other villagers and not to fall too far behind the representative in
terms of final income. Therefore, for a representative who applies the exclude-one
strategy, it is optimal to exclude the poorest villager (Propositions 3 and 4 in the
SM) (Abbink and Ellman 2010).
Hypothesis REP-2: Representatives who implement the exclude-one strategy will
most likely exclude the poorest villager.
The preceding discussion deals with aggregate outcomes but is silent about the pos-
sible dynamics leading to these outcomes. For a fully informed representative, it can
be optimal to form a minimal coalition with two middle-endowment villagers. How-
ever, as already pointed out, representatives have only incomplete information about
villagers’ inequality aversion. Hence, especially in early rounds they might—by
mistake—choose allocations where two or more villagers still vote in favor of dis-
approval. Representatives experiencing disapproval, although offering positive
shares to the villagers, may find it optimal to revert to the secure ‘‘exclude-all’’ strat-
egy. Importantly, in comparison to an unsuccessful other strategy, keeping all
resources will not lower the likelihood of disapproval and representatives applying
such a strategy will not learn more about the villagers’ true inequality aversion. In
turn, this may make them stick to this secure strategy. We formulate our first hypoth-
esis regarding the dynamics of representatives’ strategy choices:
Hypothesis REP-3: Experienced disapproval induces representatives to switch to
the exclude-all strategy, and once using this strategy they are likely to stick to it.
In Hypothesis REP-1, we formulated our expectations regarding representative’s
strategy choices in the different treatments. Here we formulate some ideas about the
dynamics leading to these outcomes. According to Hypothesis VIL-4, disapproval
rates are higher when the allocation is commonly known (CI condition) or voting
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is secret than when each villager only knows her own share (PI condition) or voting
is public. This, together with the fact that the representative has only incomplete
knowledge about the villagers’ inequality aversion, implies that a representative
will find it more difficult to avoid disapproval (and hence more likely switch to
the exclude-all strategy) in the CI condition or when voting is secret than in the
PI condition or when voting is public. This leads us to our second hypothesis
regarding representatives’ adjustment of strategies:
Hypothesis REP-4: In the treatments where allocation decisions are commonly
known or voting is secret, representatives will most frequently switch to the
exclude-all strategy.
Overall, we have seen that theoretically the LDM can lead to disapproval voting due
to inequality aversion among villagers. The developed hypotheses also predict that
both voting behavior and representatives’ allocations depend on whether the alloca-
tion is commonly known or not and whether voting is public or secret. Whether these
predictions are borne out by the data is discussed in the next section.
Empirical Results
We start with an analysis of voting behavior of the villagers and how it differs across
treatments. Thereafter, we continue with reporting results regarding the strategies
chosen by representatives. We base the statistical tests and regressions on data from
all rounds. To test the robustness of the results with respect to a last round effect, we
additionally perform all tests and regressions without observations from the last
round. All reported results appear robust. The detailed results of the robustness test
can be found in the SM.
Villagers’ Voting Behavior
We use probit regression analysis to examine determinants of villagers’ voting deci-
sions (Hypotheses VIL-1 and VIL-2) and how these decisions vary across treatments
(Hypotheses VIL-3 and VIL-4). Descriptive statistics of villagers’ voting behavior
can be found in the SM. For the regression, we pool all treatments and use a depen-
dent variable equal to 1 if a villager voted for disapproval and zero otherwise. To
investigate whether villagers are more likely to vote in favor of disapproval the
lower their share (part 1 of VIL-1) and whether the poorest villagers have a higher
likelihood to vote in favor of disapproval (part 2 of VIL-1), we control for the share a
villager received and a dummy for the initial endowment (equal to 1 if the villager
has intermediate initial wealth). We expect a higher likelihood of disapproval voting
when there is common information on the allocation (CI) than when there is not (PI)
(Hypothesis VIL-2). To test this, we include a dummy variable equal to 1 for the CI
condition. Finally, to test the hypothesis that voting in favor of disapproval is more
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likely when voting is public than when it is secret (Hypothesis VIL-3) we include a
dummy variable equal to 1 for the public voting condition.
Table 2 reports the results of the probit regression. As expected, the received
share exerts a significantly negative influence on villagers’ likelihood to vote in
favor of disapproval. We also find that, in line with our hypothesis, middle-
endowment villagers have a significantly lower probability of voting for disapproval
(14.3 percent) than the poorest villagers.
The regression table also shows that in CI, where the allocation is fully disclosed
to all villagers, the villagers’ propensity to vote in favor of disapproval increases
significantly (p < .10 for two-sided test). In addition, as hypothesized, we find a
significant adverse effect of public voting on disapproval voting. With public vot-
ing, villagers are 12.9 percent less likely to vote for disapproval. Hence, Hypoth-
eses VIL-2 and VIL-3 find support by the data. We summarize the main
observations in a first result.
Result 1. Determinants of villagers’ voting decisions: Villagers’ propensity of dis-
approval voting significantly decreases with the received share and is highest
for the poorest villagers. In addition, villagers are more likely to vote in favor
of disapproval when the allocation of resources is common information and
when voting is secret.
So far, we have looked at individual voting decisions. However, it is actually imple-
mented disapproval that affects final earnings and potentially influences the repre-
sentative’s decisions. Therefore, we take a closer look at the disapproval rate and
how it differs across treatments. In the following, we take the disapproval rate in
each group across all rounds as the independent unit of observation. We find that the
Table 2. Determinants of Disapproval Voting.
Received share 0.011***
(0.001)
Middle-endowment villager (dummy) 0.143***
(0.051)
Common information on the allocation (dummy) 0.118*
(0.064)




Prob > w2 0.0000
Predicted probability 44.37%
Note. Probit regression with round fixed effects. Marginal probabilities reported. Robust standard errors
to correct for intragroup dependencies.
Significance levels (two-sided): *10 percent, **5 percent, ***1 percent.
D’Exelle and Riedl 639
disapproval rates are significantly lower in the public voting and PI treatment
(median rate: 0.30) than in the secret voting and CI treatment (median rate: 0.60)
(Mann–Whitney (MW) z ¼ 2.767; one-sided p ¼ .003). For all other pair-wise treat-
ment comparisons, differences are not statistically significant (p > .218, two-sided
MW tests). When pooling the data of PI and CI, disapproval of the allocation is sig-
nificantly more frequent when voting is secret (median rate: 0.50) than when it is pub-
lic (median rate: 0.30) (MW z¼ 1.734; one-sided p¼ .042). When pooling the data of
both voting conditions, disapproval is more frequent in CI (median rate: 0.60) than in
PI (median rate: 0.30; MW z ¼ 1.495; one-sided p ¼ .068). These observations are
summarized in the following result, which is in concordance with Hypothesis VIL-4.
Result 2. Disapproval rates across treatments: Disapproval rates are lower
(1) when villagers are informed only about their own share than when the allo-
cation is fully disclosed and (2) when voting is public than when it is secret.
In terms of our example, the results regarding disapproval voting support the idea
that inequality aversion could make the LDM effective, because inequality averse
villagers are more likely to disapprove an allocation of resources the higher the share
captured by the representative. The results also show that disapproval voting is influ-
enced by the informational details regarding the allocation and the voting rules.
Whether the LDM is actually effective naturally depends on the response of the rep-
resentative to the threat and actual experience of disapproval under the different con-
ditions. This is examined next.
Representatives’ Distribution Decisions
We focus on some main results related to our hypotheses and relegate detailed
descriptive statistics of the proposed distributions to the SM. To test our hypotheses
regarding the strategies used by representatives, we classify them in the following
way. First, we look at the number of villagers excluded by representatives. Second,
we look at the share a representative keeps and distinguish between allocations
where the representative keeps more than the equal share (i.e., more than 50 francs)
and allocations where he keeps at most the equal share (i.e., exactly 50 francs or
less). For convenience, we refer to the former as high share and to the latter as low
share.
This procedure returns eight classes of strategies, which are shown in Table 3,
together with their observed relative frequencies. From the table, it can be clearly
seen that representatives neither exclude exactly two villagers nor do they (almost
never) choose a strategy where exactly one villager is excluded and only a low share
kept. In the following, without loss of substantial information, we focus on the
remaining four most frequent classes of strategies, which are highlighted in Table 3.
Representatives use the exclude-one-high-share (henceforth, exclude-one) strat-
egy, where exactly one villager is offered nothing, most frequently (32.90 percent of
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all cases). The use of this strategy is consistent with the idea that a representative
tries to form a minimal coalition with two villagers who approve the allocation while
keeping a relatively large share of the additional resources for himself. The exclude-
all strategy, where the representative keeps all additional resources, is applied in
17.74 percent of the cases. The remaining two strategies no-exclusion-low-share and
no-exclusion-high-share have in common that they do not exclude any villager but
differ in the share the representative keeps. The strategy no-exclusion-low-share,
where the representative keeps at most the equal share, is used in 26.13 percent and
the no-exclusion-high-share, where the representative keeps at least the equal share,
is used in 19.68 percent of all cases.
In sum, both no-exclusion strategies comprise about 45 percent of all strategy
choices. When assuming that representatives have perfect knowledge of villagers’
inequality aversion, the use of these strategies is not predicted for representatives
that are selfish or only weakly inequality averse. Strongly inequality-averse repre-
sentatives should equalize final incomes, a strategy that is observed in only
3.23 percent of all cases. Alternatively, fair-minded but self-serving representa-
tives may interpret equality as an equal distribution of the additional resources,
which is observed in 12.80 percent of the cases. The remaining 29.78 percent of
cases where no villager is excluded are likely reflecting a mixture of self-
serving fair-mindedness and incomplete information about villagers’ actual
inequality aversion. In these cases, representatives neither exclude some villagers
nor propose large shares to them.
In the remainder of this section, we focus on the strategies where either one or all
villagers are excluded and test the corresponding hypotheses formulated in the pre-
vious section. Recall that we have confirmed Hypothesis VIL-4, according to which
disapproval is more frequent when the representative’s allocation is commonly
known (CI), than when it is not (PI), and also more frequent with secret voting than
with public voting (cf. Result 2). Therefore, according to Hypothesis REP-1, we
should see that the exclude-one strategy is used less often (and the exclude-all strat-
egy more often) with CI on the allocation than with PI, and when voting is secret
than when it is public. To investigate this, we compare for each treatment the relative
Table 3. Classification of Representatives’ Strategies and Their Frequencies.
Share of representative
Low share (50 francs) (%) High share (>50 francs) (%)




Note. N ¼ 1240. Pooled over all rounds, groups, and treatments.
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frequencies of the chosen strategies. Figure 1 shows these frequencies (bars)
together with the disapproval rate (dashed line). There are pronounced differences
in the relative frequencies of strategies used by representatives across treatments.
Irrespective of the voting procedure, the exclude-one strategy is used most often
when each villager only knows her own share in the allocation (PI). The no-
exclusion-low-share is most often used when the allocation is commonly known
(CI) and voting public, whereas the frequency of the exclude-all strategy is lowest
with PI and public voting.
We test whether these differences across treatments are statistically significant
with pair-wise MW tests, using relative frequencies per group (i.e., representative)
as independent units of observation. The exclude-one strategy is significantly more
frequent in the treatment with public voting and PI (median relative frequency:
0.55) than in the treatment with secret voting and CI (median relative frequency:
0.00) (MW z ¼ 1.880; one-sided p ¼ .030) or with public voting and CI (median
relative frequency: 0.15; MW z¼ 1.852; one-sided p¼ .032). All other pair-wise treat-
ment comparisons do not show statistically significant differences (p values > .186,
two-sided tests).
The significant differences are mainly driven by the difference in used strategies





















Figure 1. Strategy choice and disapproval rate by treatment.
Note: All rounds and groups pooled.
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that the exclude-one strategy is used significantly less often when the allocation is
commonly known (CI) (median relative frequency: 0.10) than when each villager
only knows her own share (PI) (median relative frequency: 0.50) (MW z ¼ 1.733;
one-sided p ¼ .042). This result supports the first part of Hypothesis REP-1 regard-
ing differences in the use of that strategy in PI and CI. The second part of Hypothesis
REP-1 predicts also a differential use of that strategy under the two voting rules.
However, no significant difference is found when pooling the data of PI and CI and
comparing secret voting (median relative frequency: 0.20) and public voting (med-
ian relative frequency: 0.30) (MW z ¼ 1.128; one-sided p ¼ .130).
The exclude-all strategy is significantly used less often when voting is public
and each villager only knows his or her own share (PI) (median relative frequency:
0.05) than in the treatments with secret voting and common information on
the allocation (CI) (median relative frequency: 0.20) (MW z ¼ 1.808; one-sided
p ¼ .036) and secret voting and private information (PI) (median relative fre-
quency: 0.15) (MW z ¼ 1.480; one-sided p ¼ .069).
At closer inspection, the significant differences can be attributed to differences in
behavior in the two voting conditions. When pooling the data of PI and CI, the rela-
tive frequency of the exclude-all strategy is significantly lower with public voting
(median relative frequency: 0.05) than with secret voting (median relative fre-
quency: 0.20) (MW z ¼ 1.757; one-sided p ¼ .040). This result supports the second
part of Hypothesis REP-1, regarding differences in the use of the exclude-all strategy
under the two voting rules. For the first part of Hypothesis REP-1, which predicts
different frequencies of the exclude-all strategy when the information on the alloca-
tion differs, no statistical support is found. (PI: median relative frequency: 0.10; CI:
median relative frequency: 0.10; MW z¼ 0.654; one-sided p¼ .257). All remaining
pairwise treatment comparisons for this strategy also do not reveal significant
differences (p > .314, two-sided MW tests). Finally, the relative frequencies of the
no-exclusion-low-share-strategy and the no-exclusion-high-share-strategy do not
significantly differ across treatments (p > .205 and p > .237, respectively, two-
sided MW tests). We summarize the significant test results in the following result:
Result 3. Representatives’ use of exclude-one and exclude-all strategies: The
exclude-one strategy is used most often when villagers know only their own
share in the allocation (PI) and the exclude-all strategy is used least often when
voting is public.
Hypothesis REP-2 predicts that the poorest villagers are the ones who are most likely
excluded when representatives use the exclude-one strategy. To test this, we take
observations where the exclude-one strategy is followed and estimate with a probit
regression the likelihood that a villager with a particular initial wealth is excluded. For
this, we use a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the villager is the poorest one (oth-
erwise 0) as explanatory variable. We estimate separate regressions for the public and
secret voting treatments, which allows us to test whether excluding the poorest villager
D’Exelle and Riedl 643
follows from a correct anticipation of poorest villagers’ higher propensity to disap-
proval voting, or if it is the result of representatives observing and learning that. The
latter is only possible when voting is public. Table 4 presents the results.
With secret voting, the estimated coefficient is insignificant. With public voting,
however, poorest villagers have a 40 percent higher probability to be excluded.
Hence, we can confirm Hypothesis REP-2 when voting is public. Recall that from
our regression results on villagers’ voting behavior we know that poorest villagers
have a higher propensity of disapproval voting. Since this is observed by represen-
tatives only when voting is public, the result is consistent with the interpretation that
representatives have (a) incomplete knowledge of villagers’ inequality aversion and,
thus, their inclination to vote in favor of disapproval and (b) that they respond to the
observed higher likelihood of disapproval voting of the poorest villagers by exclud-
ing them. We summarize this in the following result:
Result 4. Representatives’ use of the exclude-one strategy: Representatives who
follow the exclude-one strategy most likely exclude the poorest villager, when
voting is public.
Regarding our guiding example, the previous two results together with the observed
frequencies of strategy use lends partial support to the effectiveness of the LDM. On
the positive side, we observe that representatives are far from trying to capture all
additional resources most of the time. Yet, on the negative side, we observe the fol-
lowing: first, there are still many cases where representatives capture all the
resources (17.74 percent of the allocation decisions; Table 3); second, in many cases,
strategies excluding at least one villager are used (54.19 percent of the allocation
decisions; Table 3); third, when exactly one villager is excluded it mostly hits the
poorest one. In the following, we present results that shed some light on the reasons
for the latter observations.
In particular, we analyze dynamics in the adjustment process of representatives’
strategies over time and how this relates to experienced disapproval. Recall that
Table 4. Likelihood of Excluded Villager.
Secret voting Public voting
Marg. Prob. SE Marg. Prob. SE
Poorest villager (dummy) 0.072 0.251 0.400** 0.154
N 126 180
Pseudo R2 .0041 .1236
Observed probability .3333 .3333
Note. Probit regression with round fixed effects. Robust standard errors (SE) to correct for intragroup
dependencies. Only observations with ‘‘exclude-one’’ strategy.
Significance levels (two-sided): *10 percent, **5 percent, ***1 percent.
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Hypothesis REP-3 states that experienced disapproval leads to a more frequent use
of the exclude-all strategy and that there is some inertia once it is used. To test this,
we run the following probit regression. The dependent variable takes the value 1 if
the representative chooses the exclude-all strategy and 0 otherwise. Three dummy
variables are added as explanatory variables. The first dummy is equal to 1 when
the representative experienced disapproval in the previous round; the second
dummy is equal to 1 when the representative chose the exclude-all strategy in
the previous round; the third dummy is equal to 1 when the representative chose
the exclude-all strategy and also experienced disapproval in the previous round.
Table 5 shows the results.
All three coefficients are statistically significant. The significantly positive coef-
ficient of the dummy indicating experienced disapproval in the previous round
shows that representatives who were not using the exclude-all strategy (in this case,
the other two dummies are equal to zero) have a significantly higher likelihood of
changing their strategy into the exclude-all strategy after having experienced disap-
proval. We also observe that the coefficient of the second dummy, indicating the use
of the exclude-all strategy in the previous round, is significantly positive, whereas
the coefficients of the other two dummies nullify each other (they are similar in size
but of opposite sign). This shows that irrespective of having experienced disapproval
or approval in the previous round, once the exclude-all strategy is used, representa-
tives tend to stick to this strategy. We summarize this in the following result
Result 5. Disapproval and the use of the exclude-all strategy: Experienced disap-
proval induces representatives to switch to the exclude-all strategy and once
using this strategy representatives are very likely to stick to it.
We have seen that disapproval rates as well as representatives’ strategy choices dif-
fer across treatments (Results 2 and 3). We now investigate whether there are
Table 5. Likelihood of the ‘‘Exclude-All’’ Strategy.
Coef. SE
Disapproval in round t  1 (dummy) 1.909*** 0.354
Exclude-all-strategy in round t  1 (dummy) 2.048*** 0.694




Prob > w2 .0000
Note. Random effects panel data model. The start of the process coincides with the start of the
observation period for each individual, therefore the initial observations can be assumed to be exogenous
and a standard random effects probit model estimated (Stewart 2006).
Significance levels (two-sided): *10 percent, **5 percent, ***1 percent.
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different dynamics in the strategy choice, across treatments, or if representatives set-
tle on their strategies right from the beginning. We also take a closer look at the
dynamics of disapproval in the different treatments.
Table 6 shows for each treatment the Spearman correlation coefficient
between the relative frequency of a particular strategy in a certain round and the
round number. In the last column, the table also shows the Spearman correlation
coefficient between disapproval rates and the round number. The correlations
reported in the table clearly show that in all except one treatment the frequency
of the exclude-all strategy strongly and significantly increases over time at
the expense of other strategies. Only in the treatment with public voting and pri-
vate information on the allocation (PI), strategy choices do not significantly
change over time.
Table 6 also shows that over time the exclude-all strategy is used more often at
the expense of the exclude-one strategy when villagers only know their own share
(PI) and voting is secret, while representatives stick to the exclude-one strategy with
PI and when voting is public. In the latter treatment, the use of the exclude-one strat-
egy is also relatively successful in avoiding disapproval as in this treatment the
exclude-one strategy is most frequent and disapproval rates are lowest (cf. Figure 1).
Interestingly, in no treatment, disapproval rates significantly increase over time.
This confirms that in the three treatments where we see an increased use of the
exclude-all strategy, it is experienced disapproval that makes representatives to
switch to this strategy. We formulate our final result which is largely confirming our
Hypothesis REP-4.
Result 6. Disapproval and the dynamics of different strategies: With secret voting
or common information on the allocation representatives have a tendency to
switch to the exclude-all strategy. In the treatment where villagers only know
their own share of the allocation and voting is public, disapproval is relatively
infrequent and many representatives follow the exclude-one strategy without
exhibiting a significant trend to change strategies.









PI/sec.vot. 0.818*** 0.619* 0.532 0.652** 0.485
PI/pub.vot. 0.275 0.359 0.117 0.125 0.304
CI/sec.vot. 0.749** 0.342 0.619* 0.178 0.045
CI/pub.vot. 0.776*** 0.389 0.820*** 0.392 0.161
Note. Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients; significance levels (two-sided): *10 percent,
**5 percent, ***1 percent.
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Regarding our example, these results suggest that the inability of a LDM to
completely ban elite capture and exclusion is partly induced by the fact that repre-
sentatives are unable to avoid disapproval voting of inequality averse villagers. In
response, representatives either stick to a strategy where exactly one villager is
excluded, which induces relatively low disapproval rates, or revert to the ‘‘safe’’
strategy of excluding all villagers from the aid resources.
Conclusion
In this article, we experimentally study resource allocations among groups with
members who differ in their initial wealth and where a permanent representative
repeatedly distributes resources among poorer members. To examine the effective-
ness of a political control instrument of majority disapproval voting which materi-
ally hurts the representative, we systematically vary information regarding
resource allocations and examine the effects of secret and public disapproval voting.
We find that disapproval is not very effective in enforcing representatives to
behave more prosocially. Quite to the contrary, disapproval increases the frequency
with which representatives keep all resources leaving nothing to the rest of the
group. Importantly, however, disapproval voting and representatives’ resource alloca-
tions are systematically influenced by information regarding the actual allocation and
the voting regime. First, we find that disapproval rates are highest when voting is
secret or when the allocation is commonly known. Second, representatives are rela-
tively successful in avoiding disapproval by excluding the poorest group member from
the resources, when information on received shares is private and voting is public.
These results are a consequence of voting behavior: the probability of voting in favor
of disapproval decreases with the received share of resources and the poorest group
members have a significantly higher propensity to vote in favor of disapproval.
For concreteness, in the article, we have put our setup into the frame of the
allocation of resources provided by an aid donor through a local representative and
interpreted the possibility of disapproval as an LDM. Hence, our results can be inter-
preted as a laboratory test of this specific LDM, which turned out to be only partially
successful. On the positive side, we observe that representatives do not always try to
capture all resources because inequality averse villagers are likely to disapprove
such an unfair allocation. On the negative side, we still observe quite some instances
where representatives try to appropriate all resources, mainly because they fail to
avoid disapproval. Furthermore, representatives try to build a minimal coalition
where they exclude the poorest villager.
Beyond the concrete example, our study sheds light on the role of information
regarding resource allocations and disapproval voting in more general settings akin
to our setup and described in the Introduction. Specifically, private versus common
information on the allocation and secret versus public voting have systematic and
significant differential effects on intended and actual disapproval as well as the ulti-
mately emerging distribution of wealth. When group members only know their own
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share of the allocation and voting is public, disapproval rates are substantially lower
and thus efficiency is higher. At the same time, however, under these conditions the
poorest member of the group is mostly excluded from all resources. Hence, for opti-
mal policy design, our results suggest that policy makers should take information
effects and voting rules into account but will need to choose between the lesser of
two evils: inefficiency and inequality.
Notably, the observed exclude-one strategy in our game resembles the minimal
winning coalition equilibrium as predicted in legislative bargaining games with
closed rule (Baron and Ferejohn 1989). In our experiment, the representative aims
to satisfy a ‘‘minimal majority’’ by giving two of the three other group members
a sufficiently high share to make them approving the allocation. Similarly, in legis-
lative bargaining with closed rule, only a minimal majority of committee members
receives a positive share of the distributed benefits. However, while the emergence
of a minimal majority voting equilibrium in legislative bargaining does not require
inequality averse agents, the exclude-one equilibrium in our game requires such
‘‘social preferences’’ on the voters’ side. In our game, the ‘‘reversion level’’ (the
payoff without agreement) of a voter increases with a higher share received because,
in contrast to legislative bargaining games, the allocation is always implemented,
irrespective of the voting outcome. With selfish preferences this implies that no
voter has any incentive to disapprove an allocation as her reversion level is always
lower than what she would get without disapproval. Yet, when introducing inequal-
ity aversion, for sufficiently unfair proposals, the reversion level may be larger than
the utility from just accepting the proposal. This also points at the importance of tak-
ing into account the potential interaction between inequality aversion and details of
the decision environment when analyzing decentralized allocation mechanisms.
There are a couple of extensions that seem interesting to be pursued in future
work. First, the material loss for the representative due to disapproval is rather high
and the cost-to-effectiveness ratio for the potentially disapproving voters rather low.
Nevertheless, we find that representatives do not behave strongly prosocial. Evi-
dence from related public goods with punishment experiments suggest that a smaller
material loss would be even less effective in inducing prosocial behavior (see Egas
and Riedl [2008] Nikiforakis and Normann [2008], and the discussion in the Intro-
duction). Yet, our setup of resource allocation with disapproval voting differs in sev-
eral aspects from public goods with individual punishment experiments, which may
make it worthwhile to investigate the robustness of our results in respect to the cost-
to-effectiveness ratio of disapproval. Second, the situation investigated in our
experiment applies to groups and organizations where a single representative
remains firmly in power. Admittedly, the assumption of a permanent representative
is not applicable in all decentralized resource allocation problems and altering it may
lead to interesting new insights. Specifically, voting behavior and distribution deci-
sions may change when a threat of replacement by alternative representatives exists.
Third, resource allocations are not always imposed in a dictatorial way, but are often
the outcome of a more complicated bargaining process. Therefore, future research
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should allow for more complex bargaining procedures, perhaps with differences in
bargaining power between group members. Fourth, in our experiment, the different
institutions were imposed exogenously and kept fixed within each treatment. How-
ever, in the field communities and groups, often design institutions themselves that
may change over time. Therefore, endogenous institution formation is another
interesting avenue of future research. A recent study that takes the endogeneity
of institutions seriously is Kosfeld, Okada, and Riedl (2009), who studied the con-
ditions under which sanctioning institutions are formed in public good experi-
ments. It would be interesting to extend such research to resource allocation
problems as discussed in this article.
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Notes
1. In the experiment subjects in a group were labeled A, B, C, and D, and also otherwise neu-
tral labels were used (see the experiment instructions in the SM).
2. We use francs as the experimental money unit. Participants were paid their total earnings
according to the exchange rate of 100 francs ¼ 50 euro cent.
3. There are transaction costs of disapproval because, in our leading example, a disapproval
voting outcome has to be communicated to the aid donor. Since aid donors usually do not
have their offices in the villages but in urban centers informing them is costly for the vil-
lagers (e.g., travelling costs, communication costs). To cover these costs, a representative
of the villagers may be paid from contributions made by all villagers. We let each villager
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bear the same cost irrespective of her individual voting decision because we want to avoid
complications by adding an additional collective action dimension to the voting decisions.
4. To derive this result, we assume that inequality aversion is not the same for all villagers
and that subjects represent a random sample of the distribution of tastes.
5. In the SM, we show that for reasonably assumed inequity parameters it holds that a middle-
endowment villager is more likely to vote in favor of disapproval under common informa-
tion whenever the representative keeps at least 72 francs.
6. Regarding the representative, disadvantageous inequality does not play a role because he
can always make a proposal that equalizes income and such a proposal will never be disap-
proved. Further, a representative with Fehr-Schmidt inequality aversion and advantageous
inequality parameter b larger or equal 3=4 will make a proposal that equalizes income. Intui-
tively, this is the case because the marginal utility increase from keeping one more unit of
money is one, which is smaller (or at most equal) than the marginal utility decrease from
increased advantageous inequality of 4=3  b (b is larger or equal than 3=4). The Fehr-
Schmidt assumption of self-centered inequality aversion guarantees that the representative
does not make a proposal that makes her worse off than in the equal income case. If b is
strictly smaller than 3=4 the opposite reasoning applies. In that case, the representative’s utility
is strictly increasing in her own monetary payoff (despite the increase in advantageous
inequality) and the optimal action is to maximize her income subject to the villagers’ disap-
proval voting behavior. Hence, representatives who are not strongly advantageous inequality
averse will behave like representatives who are pure money maximizers.
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